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Abstract 
This paper examines a change in the level of competition in the Japanese life insurance 
industry over the last 17 years. We estimate the first order condition for profit-maximizing 
insurance oligopolies to obtain the degree of non-competition and collusion.  Estimation 
results suggest that: 1) not only stock companies, but also mutual companies maximize their 
own profits rather than pay out dividends to policyholders; 2) competition has become stronger 
since 1995; 3) revision of Insurance Industry Law and failures of insurance companies 
promoted the competition; and 4) the competition in the recent years is still more lax than the 
pre-war period. 
 
 
JEL Classification Number: G22, L13, L21 
 
Keywords: Life insurance, Degree of competition, Collusion, Japan  
                                                 
∗ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Monetary Economics Workshop (MEW) and the 
Annual Meeting of the Japan Economic Society. The authors are grateful to Charles Yuji Horioka, 
Yasuhiko Tanigawa, Shinsuke Ikeda, Hirofumi Uchida, Takashi Kaneko, Takao Ohkawa, Tomio Iguchi, 
and Andrew Coors for their comments. 
†Corresponding author: Yoshiro Tsutsui, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, 
6-1, Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, 567-0047 Japan,  Phone: +81-6-6879-8560, Fax: +81-6-6878-2766, e-mail: 
tsutsui@econ.osaka-u.ac.jp 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not the Japanese life insurance industry has 
become more competitive in the last 17 years. The financial liberalization introduced in the 
1970s has not resulted in increased competition in the traditional banking, securities, and 
insurance industries (see Ikeo, 1995; Horiuchi, 1999). Liberalization in the insurance industry 
in particular is lagging behind that of the other financial industries. The level of competition 
and the economic efficiency of the life insurance industry have thus been considered low.1
In 1996, a new Insurance Industry Law was enacted. This resulted in the formation of 11 
non-life insurance companies’ subsidiaries, which then began business in the life insurance 
industry. The number of life insurance companies immediately jumped to 41. In November of 
the same year, Prime Minister Hashimoto declared the commencement of the Financial Big 
Bang, and in June 1997 the Insurance Council submitted a report that outlined the anticipated 
schedule of liberalization for the following four years. Although there is debate as to whether 
the tempo of the scheduled liberalization was quick enough, such a movement toward 
liberalization unambiguously suggests that competition in the life insurance industry is 
improving. This paper attempts to confirm this suggestion. 
A huge literature considers the efficiency, productivity, and the economies of scale and of 
scope in the life insurance industry.2 These studies, however, mainly focus on US firms. Few 
analyses are known regarding Japanese life insurance firms. Tsutsui et al. (1992) and Kitasaka 
(1996) analyzed scale and scope economies in the Japanese life insurance industry for 20 
incumbent firms. Fukuyama (1997) considered the efficiency and productivity growth in the 
Japanese life insurance industry during the period 1988–1993. McKenzie (2002) estimated the 
                                                 
1 Chuma et al. (1993) examined the technical efficiency of Japanese life insurance companies. They 
reported that efficiency differs substantially between insurance companies and that it does not depend 
on the form of the company, i.e., whether it is a mutual or stock company.  
2 Cummins and Weiss (2000) surveyed papers on these topics focusing on the studies using modern 
frontier efficiency methodologies in both the life and property-liability insurance industries. 
 1
cost function, taking into account ownership types. 
With regard to the competitiveness of the Japanese life insurance industry, Tsutsui (1990) 
examined the change in competition in the industry from the end of the Second World War 
until 1986, using the industrial organization concepts of ‘market structure’ and ‘market 
performance’. He concluded that the change in market structure and performance since 1980 
suggested an increase in competition. When considering that he found signs of liberalization in 
the data available up until 1986, we may discover that there are more pronounced changes in 
the level of competition to be revealed in a more recent sample.  
This paper takes a more theoretical approach than that of Tsutsui (1990) and directly 
estimates the degree of competition. Utilizing the regression equations with panel data from 
1986 to 2002, we clearly establish that there has been a change in the degree of competition 
during that period. One merit of the estimation method used for this paper is that by using 
panel data, the estimates of the degree of competition are given for each year.3 This enables us 
to investigate the short-term changes in the degree of competition.4 The method proposed by 
Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) only reveals the average degree of competition for a long 
period because it uses aggregated time series data. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the recent status of the 
Japanese life insurance industry is summarized. In section 3, we derive regression equations to 
clarify the behavior of mutual and stock companies, and to estimate the degree of competition. 
Section 4 is devoted to a presentation of the estimation results. Firstly, we show the 
conclusions derived for the purpose of insurance companies. Secondly, we present the 
indicated levels of non-competition and collusion. Thirdly, the causes for change in these 
                                                 
3 Angelini and Cetorelli (1999) analyzed 1983–97 panel data for Italian banks to estimate the Lerner 
index. 
4 The method of Panzar and Rosse (1987) enables us to estimate the degree of competition for each year. 
However, it requires data on input prices for each insurance firm, which are not available to us. 
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competitive indexes are examined. Fourthly, the recent degree of competition is compared with 
that which existed in the pre-war period. Section 5 summarizes our conclusions. 
 
2. The Japanese Life Insurance Industry from 1986 to 2002 
2.1 The life insurance business under the Bubble Economy and the Heisei Depression 
The period from 1986 to 2002, which we analyze in this paper, consists of the bubble period 
and the long stagnation. The purpose of the analysis is to evaluate to what extent liberalization 
proceeded in these 17 years and how the non-competitive situation, which was dominant 
throughout the post-war period, has changed. We need to be careful that the dramatic 
movements in Japanese business conditions over these 17 years do not in fact conceal a 
long-term structural change, if such exists.  
The Japanese economy enjoyed a boom, the so-called ‘Bubble Economy’, in the late 1980s. 
However, after the stock price bubble burst in 1990 and the land price bubble did likewise in 
1991, the Japanese economy fell into a long period of stagnation called ‘the Heisei Depression’. 
In Figure 1, we show the GDP growth rate and the growth rate of the value of policies in force 
over the whole life insurance industry. The GDP growth rate has been close to zero since 1992. 
While it rose temporarily in 1995 and 1996, it fell to a negative figure in 1998, and except for 
2000 remained negative. Figure 1 shows that the contrast between the boom in the late 1980s 
and the depression in the 1990s is even more pronounced for the life insurance industry. 
Specifically, whilst the annual growth rate of the value of policies in force was over 10% in the 
late 1980s, it declined and reached –10% in 1997 and was negative in consecutive years 
thereafter except for 2001.  
Figure 2 shows the change in the current profit rate as the current profit/asset ratio of the 
corporate sector for all industries and of the life insurance industry for the same period. 
Whereas the profit rate of the whole industrial sector declined from the 1980s to the 1990s, the 
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decline of that rate within the life insurance industry was much larger, as that sector 
deteriorated more than the average for the whole of the sector. The profit rate of the life 
insurance business was less than 1% after 1993, whereas that for the whole of industry was 
greater than 2%.  
It is not easy to discover the reasons for this deterioration in the life insurance sector 
during the 1990s. There is no doubt, however, that the long-term contracts of companies were 
one cause. Life insurance contracts imply the collection of a premium and payments of claims 
over a couple of decades, however revenues were not necessarily invested in equivalent 
long-term assets. Insurance companies thus assumed interest rate variation risks. Such risks 
were realized in the depression following an unanticipated fall in interest rates when the 
average for a loan fell from 7.6% in 1991 to 1.9% in 2001. 
In Figure 3, the change in yield of assets and the assumed interest rate are shown. The 
assumed interest rate is the expected return on the assets of the company considered in setting 
the insurance premium rate. To maintain solvency, the assumed interest is set at a lower level 
than the premium rate, and the ex-post gain is distributed to policyholders as dividends. In 
Figure 3, data on the yield of assets are taken from Insurance: issue of life insurance statistics, 
and data on assumed interest rates are taken from Toyo Keizai Weekly: special issue of life 
insurance. The assumed interest rate is not a new one, but the average such rate for outstanding 
contracts that have been available since 1992. Yields of assets have been declining since 1987, 
falling remarkably after the burst of the bubble. Although the assumed interest rate has also 
been lowered, the back spread ran to 1.57% in 1993 and was not dissolved in 2002, because the 
new assumed interest rate in the bubble period was over 6%. 
Reflecting these severe business conditions, several insurance companies, including 
medium-sized ones such as Nissan, Toho, Daihyaku, Taisho, Chiyoda, Kyoei, and Tokyo Life, 
went bankrupt in the 1997–2000 fiscal years. 
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2.2 New entry and exit 
The original Insurance Industry Law was established in 1939 and remained intact throughout 
the post-war period. This enactment was the final step in the transition to a system in which 
premium rates, dividend rates, and solicitations were regulated. The entry of new firms was 
strictly regulated following the Second World War, leading to the maintenance of the so-called 
‘20 firms system’. Indeed, no new entry was allowed until December 1975, when Seibu-All 
State obtained a business license (see Iguchi, 1996). The revision of the Law in 1996 was 
aimed at keeping pace with an expected transition from the regulated system to a liberalized 
one. 
In the post-war period, financial institutions, banking, securities, and insurance companies, 
have been segregated from each other. Although in 1993 banks and securities companies were 
allowed to enter each other’s domain by creating subsidiaries, the insurance sector has been 
kept isolated from the other industries. Deposit interest rates were thoroughly deregulated in 
1993 and 1994, and the trade commissions for stocks trading were deregulated in 1998 and 
1999. However, the rates of non-life insurances were not deregulated until 2001, and the 
premium and dividend rates of the life insurance industry still seem to be under the control of 
the authorities. Essentially, the insurance industry has been left behind by the financial 
liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s, so that it has remained uncompetitive. 
The most remarkable change in the life insurance industry was brought about by the 
revision of the Insurance Industry Law. The new law permitted mutual entry between life and 
non-life companies through the establishment of subsidiaries.5 Thereafter, a series of failures 
and mergers of small and medium-sized firms occurred.  
The failure of Nissan Life Insurance in April 1997 collapsed the myth that life insurance 
                                                 
5 Life and non-life insurance companies were permitted to enter the third sector of insurance, which is 
represented by medical and personal accident insurance, from July 2001.  
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companies never go bankrupt. This failure may also have indicated the end of the so-called 
‘convoy administration system’ and may have disciplined life insurance firms. On the other 
hand, this failure triggered the passage of many bills treating insolvency cases in such 
companies. For example, in order to protect the policyholders of failed companies, the Life 
Insurance Policyholders Protection Corporation was formed in December 1998. Thereafter, a 
bill for a prompt corrective action was promulgated in December 1998 and enforced in April 
1999. The establishment of this act caused each of the life insurance companies on the verge of 
insolvency to form a capital alliance with, and become a subsidiary of, a foreign-based 
company.6  
In spite of these endeavors, the five small and medium-sized life insurance companies, 
Daihyaku, Taisyo, Chiyoda, Kyoei, and Tokyo, collapsed in the 2000 fiscal year. The merger 
of parent non-life insurance companies led to the merger of their life subsidiaries.7  
In summary, between 1975 and 2002, more than 20 new firms entered the market. For the 
same period, seven firms exited. These changes resulted in an increase in the number of life 
insurance companies from 1975 to 1999, whereas the number decreased from 1999 to 2002 
(see Figure 4). In view of these new entrants, a logical question is: Does this change in the 
number of firms reflect a change in competition in the life insurance industry? 
According to the ‘market structure–performance hypothesis’, if the market concentration 
decreases as the result of a new entry, the degree of competition should increase. Therefore, let 
us investigate how the market concentration has changed in the 17-year period. We use the 
Herfindahl index, taking the total assets as a proxy for firm size. The results are shown in 
                                                 
6 For example, Toho Mutual Life and Daihyaku Mutual Life formed a capital alliance respectively with 
GE Capital and Manulife Financial of Canada to establish their joint venture. Both companies, however, 
failed after about a year. Heiwa Life and Nippon Dantai Life become a subsidiary of Aetna and Axa 
groups in March 2000, respectively.  
7 For example, in April 2001, Nippon Fire Partner Life and Koa Life merged into NIPPONKOA Life, 
and Chiyodakasai EBISU Life and Dai-Tokyo Happy Life merged into Aioi Life. Mitsui Mirai Life and 
Sumitomo Yu-Yu Life merged into Mitsui Sumitomo Kaijo Life in October 2001. 
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Figure 5. The index decreases from 1986 until 1991, but only slightly. In 1950, the index was 
0.1, well below the recent level. Unexpectedly, the Herfindahl index increases for the years 
after 1996, although extensive new entry occurred at that time. There is thus no evidence that 
the market concentration decreased substantially in this period. 
Whilst the large number of new entrants in 1996 suggests an improvement in competition, 
the increase in the Herfindahl index after 1996 suggests that, if we rely upon the standard 
‘market structure–performance hypothesis’, the degree of competition decreased. The 
‘efficiency structure hypothesis’ proposed by Demsetz (1973), however, contrarily predicts that 
the increase in the Herfindahl index is caused by the enhanced competition. We will examine 
which scenario is really the case by conducting a regression analysis in section 4.3.  
 
3.  The Model 
3.1 The basic model  
In this section, we derive a model to estimate the degree of competition.8 First, let us introduce 
the variables used in this paper.  is the value of the policies in force, ,  is 
premium income,  represents claims paid,  represent dividends paid,  is 
outstanding assets,  represents yields of assets, and  is operating costs. Subscripts  
and  represent firm i  and period . Then, the profits 
tiq , ∑
=
≡
N
i
tit qQ
1
, tiI ,
Zi t, Di t, tiA ,
ri t, tiC , i
t t ti ,π  of firm i  at period  are: t
 titititititittti RSVArqCqQP ,,,,,,, )()( ∆−+−=π  (1) 
where  is the inverse demand function for life insurance,  is the cost function 
of firm , and  stands for the change in reserve of firm . Here we assume that 
)( tt QP )( ,, titi qC
i tiRSV ,∆ i
                                                 
8 For a survey of empirical studies on the degree of competition, see Martin (1993) and Bresnahan 
(1989). 
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dividends and the mean of claims to be paid are known to policyholders, so that they regard the 
net premium as the price of a policy.9 Subtracting claims paid at the definition of the price of 
an insurance policy implies that, with this price, the policyholders buy a reduction of the risk of 
future income variation by their death. 
The stock insurance company i  chooses  to maximize the profits, given , r , 
and .
tiq , tiA , i t,
tiRSV ,∆ 10 From the first order condition of the profit maximization, we obtain: 
  titi
t
t
tititi MSRqMCR ,,,,, η
µ+= ,  (2)  
where 
ti
ti
ti q
C
MC
,
,
, ∂
∂≡  is the marginal cost, 
 
 
t
t
t
t
t dP
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Q
P−≡η  is the price elasticity, 
t
ti
ti Q
q
MS ,, ≡  
is the market share of firm and tititititti DZIqPR ,,,,, −−=≡ . 
ti
t
ti q
Q
,
, ∂
∂≡µ  is assumed to be 
common for all the firms and is denoted as µ t  in order to capture the industry average degree 
of competition.11
We estimate (2) together with the cost function because marginal cost, MC, is not 
observable. We assume a translog cost function:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
,
lnlnlnlnlnlnln
,4,3
2
6
2
543
2
,2,i1,i0,t0,,
titi
tttttititi
LaGa
pbwbpbwbqbqbbbC
++
+++++++=
 (3) 
where w is the wage rate of the finance and insurance industries and p is the deflator of fixed 
capital formation. These data are not available for each firm, so we use the data which vary 
only over time. pwq lnand,ln,ln  are deviations from their means. 12  We allow for 
                                                 
9 In reality, dividends and claims will be paid in future periods. In our one-period analysis, this aspect is 
disregarded.  
10 We assume that profits gained at period t are added into assets and are invested at period t+1. 
11 See Bresnahan (1989) for this point. 
12 Using deviations from the means in the translog function is a convention to avoid possible 
multi-colinearity. 
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time-variant intercepts , firm-specific intercepts  and firm-specific slopes . The 
ratio of group insurance  and the ratio of saving insurance  are added to the cost 
function to eliminate the effect of the composition of various kinds of policies. The expected 
signs of  and  are negative and positive, respectively (see Tsutsui et al., 1992).  
tob , iob , ib ,1
tiG , tiL ,
3a 4a
Substituting the definition of marginal cost, equation (2) now becomes:  
  titititi
t
t
tititiiti LaGaRMSCqbCbR ,2,1,,,,2,,1, ln2 ++++= η
µ . (4) 
Here,  and  are added to the first order condition to eliminate the effect of the 
composition of various kinds of policies. The signs of  and  are not known a priori.
tiG , tiL ,
1a 2a
13 
We estimate equations (3) and (4) simultaneously, putting the restriction on the parameters 
over the equations. 
We obtain the estimate of tt ηµ , but tµ  cannot be identified. Thus, we evaluate the 
possible change in tµ , assuming that ηt  is constant over the estimation period. Multiplying 
µ t  with market share, we get the degree of non-competition tλ  (Bresnahan, 1982). 0=tλ  
corresponds to perfect competition and 1=tλ  to a monopoly. In Cournot competition, when 
the number of firms is , n .1 nt =λ   
 
3.2  The degree of collusion 
In order to distinguish µ t  from tη , we conduct another analysis, putting a restriction on the 
conjectural variations (Clarke and Davies, 1982; Alley, 1993). Specifically, we assume that 
when firm  increases its production by a certain rate, the other firms  increase α-times 
(
i j i≠
0 < < 1α t ) of that rate. Thus, for all  and for alli j i≠ : 
                                                 
13 An increase in savings life insurance results in an increase in premium income. However, it also leads 
to an increase in the amount of the policy paid, so that the sign of  is not determined. 2a
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ti
tj
t
ti
tj
q
q
q
q
,
,
,
, α∂ =∂ . (5) 
If α t  equals unity, (5) means that firm  predicts that other firms will respond to an 
increase of firm ’s production so as to keep the share of every firm unchanged. Alternatively, 
if 
i
i
α t  equals zero, it means that firm  predicts that other firms will not respond at all to its 
increase in production. This model corresponds to a cooperative game, in which 
i
α t  represents 
the degree of collusion. The former case is interpreted as perfect collusion and the latter 
corresponds to non-cooperative Cournot competition.  
The concept of conjectural variation is popular in both applied theoretic and empirical 
industrial organization. Theorists of industrial organization, however, take a dim view of its ad 
hoc assumptions about the conduct of firms, its lack of a game-theoretical foundation, and the 
forcing of dynamics into an essentially static model in which the strategy space and the time 
horizon of the underlying game are only loosely defined (Fellner, 1949; Friedman, 1983, 
p.110; Daughety, 1985; Makowski, 1987; and Tirole, 1989, pp. 244–245). These shortcomings 
are often perceived as the cost that the modeler must pay for realism without compromising 
simplicity and tractability. However, it is fortunate that Dockner (1992), Cabral (1995), and 
Pfaffermayr (1999) showed that the concept of conjectural variation can be supported by a 
consistent theoretical foundation if it is considered a reduced form of a dynamic game.14 Their 
findings can be used to justify a static conjectural variations analysis for both modeling 
dynamic interactions and estimating the degree of oligopoly power. From the same viewpoint, 
                                                 
14 Using an infinite horizon adjustment cost model, Dockner (1992) demonstrated that any steady state 
closed-loop (subgame-perfect) equilibrium coincides with a static conjectural variation equilibrium with 
nonzero conjectures. Cabral (1995) proved that in linear oligopolies, and for an open set of values of the 
discount factor, there exists an exact correspondence between the conjectural variation solution and the 
solution of a quantity-setting repeated game with minimax punishments during T periods. Pfaffermayr 
(1999) followed an idea put forward by Cabral (1995) and demonstrated that the conjectural variation model 
can be interpreted as the joint-profit-maximizing steady-state reduced form of a price-setting supergame in a 
differentiated product market under optimal punishment strategies. 
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we believe that the use of the static model is rationalized by considering it as a reduced form of 
an (unmodeled) dynamic game.  
Summing up (5) over all , we obtain: j ≠ i
  titttiti MSMS ,,, )1( ααµ −+= . (6) 
When α t = 0 , 1, =tiµ , corresponding to the case of Cournot competition. Assuming that 
ti ,µ is constant over , and substituting (6) into (4), we obtain, instead of (4):  i
 titititi
t
t
ti
t
t
tititiiti LaGaRMSRCqbCbR ,6,5,,,,,2,,1,
1
ln2 ++−+++= η
α
η
α
 (7) 
 
3.3  The objective of mutual insurance companies 
Two ownership structures, mutual and stock, coexist in the life insurance industry, since life 
insurance was started as mutual aid. Thus, the question: ‘Which is the better organizational 
form, a stock or a mutual company?’ has been the concern of much research.15 For example, 
Mayers and Smith (1986) examined the relative efficiency of a stock versus a 
mutual-ownership structure from the perspective of the agency cost approach. Using the data of 
30 companies changing from a stock to a mutual structure, they concluded that this change is 
on average efficiency-enhancing, whereas Spiller (1972) concluded that the mutual company is 
less efficient. 
Mayers et al. (1997) examined the relationship between board structure and organizational 
forms and found that mutual companies employ a significantly larger fraction of outside 
directors than do stock companies. These studies, however, mainly focus on US firms. 
Nevertheless, quite a few consider the Japanese life insurance industry. Notable are Fukuyama 
(1997) and McKenzie (2002), which compare the efficiency of Japanese firms of both 
                                                 
15 Mayers and Smith (2000) produced a detailed review of the literature relevant to this topic in the 
insurance industry.  
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organizational forms. Fukuyama (1997) found that mutuals and stocks had an identical 
technology and that the major sources of overall technical inefficiency were pure technical 
inefficiency in the case of mutuals and scale inefficiency in the case of stocks. He concluded 
that it is not clear which organizational form, mutual or stock, is preferable in the Japanese life 
insurance industry. McKenzie (2002) reported that the rate of return equation does not differ 
between mutual and stock companies, whereas the cost function does. 
Most of the incumbent life insurance companies in Japan are mutual companies.16 Because 
the legal owners of mutual companies are policyholders, dividends are not costs, but represent 
the main objective that the companies should pursue. Mutual insurance companies may thus 
maximize the surplus defined in equation (1) plus dividends.17 In this case, assuming that  
is proportional to , we obtain:  
tiD ,
tiq ,
 titititi
t
t
titiiiti LaGaRMSCqbCbR ,2,1,,,2,,1, ln2
~ ++++= η
µ  (8) 
where tititititti ZIDqPR ,,,,,
~ −=+≡ .  
Many people question if the mutual insurance companies are really regulated by the 
policyholders, arguing that the mutual companies act no differently from stock companies (see 
Komiya, 1994). On the other hand, some insist that mutual companies are less efficient because 
the supervision by policyholders is weaker than that by stockholders. It therefore remains 
controversial whether or not mutual life insurance companies operate for the advantage of 
policyholders, or if they only seek profits. We will investigate which situation is the closer to 
reality by comparing equations (4) and (8). 
                                                 
16 Out of the 20 firms existing in 1997, 16 were mutual companies. In recent years, however, it has been 
argued that the stock company is a more flexible style of insurance company, and consequently, the 
mutual companies are examining conversion to stock companies. Daido Life converted to a stock 
company on April 1, 2002. 
17 Note that the surplus is attributed to policyholders of mutual companies. Here we disregard the fact 
that policyholders change over time, so that the problem of the transfer of the surplus between 
policyholders emerges.  
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 4. The Estimation Results 
Our estimation period is from 1986 to 2002, and the samples are restricted to ‘domestic 
corporations’ as defined by the Insurance Industry Law. Data used for the estimation are , 
, D
tiI ,
tiZ , i,t, , , , and , which are taken from Statistics of Life Insurance Business 
in Japan, edited and published by the Insurance Research Institute, together with  and , 
which are taken from the NIKKEI NEEDS Macro data file. 
tiq , tiC , tiG , tiL ,
tw tp
 
4.1 Do mutual companies maximize profits or dividends? 
Firstly, let us examine which equation, (4) or (8), better describes the behavior of mutual 
insurance companies. Constructing: 
  tititititi
t
t
tittiiti DLaGaRMSCqbCbR ,,2,1,,,2,,1, ln2
~ βη
µ +++++= , (9) 
(4) is derived when 1=β , and (8) is derived when 0=β . Therefore, equations (4) and (8) 
constitute a non-nested hypothesis. 
We apply the double log likelihood ratio test, in which we construct a general specification, 
i.e., (9), which includes the two equations as nested hypotheses. Then, we conduct two 
likelihood ratio tests, (4) against (9), and (8) against (9), and compare the results. The 
estimation method used is three-stage least squares.18 The test results are presented in Table 1. 
When mutual companies are taken as samples, the specification that they maximize dividends 
plus profits is rejected at the 1% significance level, whilst the hypothesis that they maximize 
profits is not rejected. The same results are obtained when the stock companies are taken as 
                                                 
18 The instrumental variables are , , 
tiG , tiL , ( )21ln −tq , 1ln −ti qd , , 1,1,1 −−− titit RMSd 1ln −tp , 1ln −tw , ( )21ln −tp , ( )21ln −tw , , , , ,  and constants. The variables  and  are the time and firm 
dummies, respectively. 
1, −tiR 1, −tiMS td id 1, −tiD td id
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samples, as we expected. Thus, we conclude that both mutual and stock companies seek only 
profits, rather than dividends plus profits. The behavior of these two types of company does not 
differ, at least with respect to their objectives. 
 
4.2 The results of the basic analysis 
Given the results of the former subsection, we conduct the following analyses assuming that 
both mutual and the stock companies maximize their profits. We define the two models that we 
wish to estimate. The first model, described by equations (3) and (4), shall henceforth be called 
the estimation of the degree of non-competition. The second model, given by equations (3) and 
(7), will be called the estimation of the degree of collusion. 
 The result of the three-stage least squares estimation of the degree of non-competition is 
shown in Table 2.19 The model fits well since the determination coefficient of equation (4) is 
over 0.99 and that of the translog cost function (3) is 0.90. 
 In the estimation of first order condition (4), the coefficients of group insurance and saving 
insurance  are significantly positive, implying that companies with more of these 
insurances tend to earn more revenues. On the other hand,  are not significant in the 
cost function, implying that these variables do not affect costs. , which appears in both (3) 
and (4), is positive and highly significant and the  are all positive; 28 of the 52  are 
significant at the 5% level. However, the coefficients of  and  and their squared 
terms are all insignificant. This is probably because yearly data only are available for these 
variables. 
21 and aa
43 and aa
2b
ib ,1 ib ,1
twln tpln
tt ηµ /  are all highly significant, implying that the market has not been perfectly 
competitive. 
                                                 
19  In the estimation, we use , , 
tiG , tiL , ( )21ln −tq , 1ln −ti qd , , 1,1,1 −−− titit RMSd 1ln −tp , 1ln −tw , ( )21ln −tp , ( )21ln −tw , , , , , and constants as instrumental variables. 1, −tiR 1, −tiMS td id
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The estimates of the degree of non-competition tt ηλ  are depicted in Figure 6, together 
with their 95% confidence interval. This takes on a value between 0.25 and 0.31 during the 
period from 1986 to 1994, and then decreases sharply, reaching 0.17 in 1996. Thereafter, it 
remains almost constant. We thus conclude that the life insurance industry has become more 
competitive since 1995. The new Insurance Industry Law was passed in the Diet and 
promulgated in 1995. The insurance companies probably started various reforms, including the 
preparation of the establishment of their subsidiaries in 1995, to prepare for the enforcement of 
the law in the next year. The results reasonably reflect this fact. 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the degree of collusion. The coefficient of group 
insurance has a significantly negative sign in this case, whilst that of saving insurance has a 
positive sign in equation (7). The former is a different result from that in Table 2, but the sign 
is not known a priori. Group insurance has a significant negative coefficient in the cost 
function as expected, whereas that of saving insurance is insignificant. Notably  is positive 
and highly significant. Estimates of  are all positive, and 34 of the 46  are significant 
at the 5% level.
2b
ib ,1 ib ,1
 20 Input prices are not significant in the cost function.  
Estimates of the degree of collusion tα  are close to unity and highly significant, implying 
that the market was close to perfect collusion and Cournot competition is rejected. Estimates of 
demand elasticity tη  are also close to unity and decrease over the sample period. 
The estimates of the degree of collusion α t  are depicted in Figure 7 together with their 
95% confidence interval. α t  remains almost at the same level around unity until 1991, and 
then falls sharply, reaching 0.7 in 2002. The degree of collusion does not reject perfect 
                                                 
20 In this estimation, we assume that six firms that existed for only two years of our sample period have 
the same firm-specific intercepts  and firm-specific slopes  as each other in order to avoid the 
problems of the singularities of the data and derivatives. 
iob , ib ,1
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collusion until 1994, but rejects it thereafter. However, the value of α t  suggests that the 
competition is still lax. Whereas α t  rejects ‘perfect collusion’ at the 5% significance level 
after 1995, it is far from Cournot competition. 
The result for the degree of collusion is consistent with the results of the degree of 
non-competition in that the insurance industry became competitive over the whole observation 
period. However, the patterns are somewhat different. The degree of collusion remained 
constant until 1991, and then decreased monotonically. On the other hand, the degree of 
non-competition decreased moderately until 1994, and fell sharply in 1995 and 1996, to 
become stagnant thereafter. 
Which pattern is more reliable? We should notice that the degree of competition assumes 
constant demand elasticity tη . If this elasticity varies substantially, the estimates do not 
represent competitiveness correctly. We obtained the estimates of tη  from the estimation of 
collusion. So let us apply the estimates to calculate tλ . The results are presented in Figure 8 
and in the right-hand column of Table 2. Looking at the figure, we notice that it rejects 
monopoly ( 1=tλ ) as well as Cournot oligopoly ( nt 1=λ ) throughout the period. That the 
Cournot oligopoly is rejected reflects the same outcome as for the degree of collusion. 
However, the fact that monopoly is rejected might contradict the result that perfect collusion 
prevailed until 1994. The pattern of the graphs shows that the degree of non-competition was 
almost constant around 0.35 until 1991, which is consistent with the observed degree of 
collusion. However, the degree of non-competition is seen to have been stagnant after 1996. 
This agrees with Figure 6 and differs from that of the degree of collusion. 
We are not sure which pattern is correct a priori. However, considering that various policy 
measures were taken that related to the failure of insurance companies, the results indicating 
that competition improved consecutively after 1995, the pattern of collusion, best fit our 
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intuition.  
 
4.3  Causes of the progress in competitiveness 
In this subsection, let us try to find out how the degree of collusion and degree of 
non-competition depend on the various elements. Here, we consider the effect of deregulation, 
i.e., the promulgation of the Insurance Law and the change of policy that ended the convoy 
system and allowed the failure of insurance firms. In addition, we consider the variables 
representing business condition (composite index) and market concentration (Herfindahl index). 
The regression equation is 
 ληλα orYuDFAILADILAHIACIXAAY tttttt ,/,,43210 =+++++=     (10) 
Here, CIX is the composite index, HI is the Herfindahl index, DIL is a dummy variable that 
represents the revision of the Insurance Industry Law, which takes the value 1 in 1995 and 
1996, and 0 otherwise, and DFAIL is a dummy variable that represents the failure of insurance 
companies, which takes the value 1 in the fiscal years 1997–2000, and 0 otherwise. 
If these new policies have a significant effect on competition, A3 and A4 are negative. We 
cannot predict the sign of business conditions a priori. The coefficient of the Herfindahl index 
will be positive if the structure–performance hypothesis applies, and negative if the 
efficient-structure hypothesis is the case (Demsetz, 1973, Berger, 1995).  
The estimation results are presented in Table 4. In the left columns, the results for the 
degree of collusion are shown. The coefficient of composite index is significantly positive, 
implying that competition was more lax than when business conditions were better. The 
coefficient of the Herfindahl index is significantly negative, supporting the efficient-structure 
hypothesis. Herfindahl index rose after 1995 because the insurance companies became more 
efficient. A3 and A4, which represent the effect of policy measures, are negative, implying that 
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these changes in policy really promoted competition.21
In the middle and right columns, we show the results of ηλ /  andλ , respectively. Here, 
we calculate λ  using the value of η  in the estimation of the degree of collusion. They 
confirm the results based on α  except that the business condition does not affect competition 
in the case of λ  and ηλ / . Thus, we conclude that the recent deregulation policy, including 
the revision of the insurance law and the abolition of the convoy administration, made the 
insurance industry more competitive. 
 
4.4 Comparison with the pre-war period 
It is said that in the pre-war period, the competition amongst life insurance companies was 
quite severe (Tsutsui et al., 2004). Premium and dividend rates were not regulated until 1937, 
nor was sales staff activity (in terms of insurance solicitation) restricted until 1931. Insurance 
companies tried to mitigate competition by means of different premium-dividend schemes in 
1917–1937 (Tsutsui et al., 2000).  
It is interesting to investigate, therefore, whether the current degree of competition is as 
great as that in the pre-war period. We estimated the degree of non-competition and degree of 
collusion using cross-section data for 1916, 1917, and 1922, when the competition was quite 
fierce. It was not necessary to include  and  because the regression is cross-sectional, 
and  and  were omitted from our estimations because of the unavailability of data.  
tw tp
tiG , tiL ,
In Figure 7, we show the degree of collusion for those years. It is about 0.5 and lower than 
for recent years, suggesting that the current competition is still weaker than during the pre-war 
period. 
                                                 
21 Revision of the Insurance Industry Law induced a remarkable increase in the number of firms, so that 
we estimated eq. (10) replacing DIL with the net change in their number. The coefficient was negative, 
but the p value was only 15%. We also estimated eq. (10) replacing DFAIL with the asset value of the 
companies in default. The coefficient was negative, but insignificant.  
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The degree of non-competition for the pre-war years is shown in Figure 6. These values 
are around 0.19 and slightly higher than that for the current years. However, since the degree of 
non-competition is divided by demand elasticity, and since it is not convincing to assume this 
elasticity to have been the same for the pre- and post-war periods, we should not directly 
compare these values. Let us therefore adopt the value of tη  for the estimation of the degree 
of collusion and multiply these estimates to get tλ . The result is shown in Figure 8. tλ  in 
2002 is 0.15, whilst it is 0.134 in 1916, suggesting that the current competition is almost at the 
level that was attained during the pre-war period. 
Which result, Figure 7 or Figure 8, is more appropriate with regard to the level of 
competition? The suggestion that the current competition is as severe as that which occurred in 
the pre-war period when there were no particular policies that would restrict competition is not 
very convincing. In this regard, the collusion result appears to be the more reliable. 
  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have examined the change in the degree of competition existing in the 
Japanese life insurance industry for the 1986–2002 period. Firstly, we investigated whether 
Japanese life insurance companies of both stock and mutual structure seek profits or dividends. 
Then, estimating the first order condition of the profit maximization, together with the cost 
function, we obtained estimates of the degree of non-competition and collusion. We also 
sought the causes of progress in competition and compared the competitiveness with that of the 
pre-war period. The conclusions we obtained from the estimation results are summarized as 
follows: 
1) Both stock and mutual companies seek to maximize profits rather than dividends to 
policyholders. 
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2) The degree of non-competition fell until 1996, and has remained almost unchanged 
thereafter. It fell particularly sharply in 1995 and 1996, when the new Insurance Industry Law 
was promulgated and enforced.  
3) The estimation of the degree of collusion reveals that competition has improved 
monotonically since 1992. The degree of collusion does not reject perfect collusion until 1994, 
but rejects it thereafter. 
4) The degree of collusion has improved following policy changes such as the revision of the 
Insurance Industry Law and the abolition of the convoy system, since which the failure of 
insurance companies has been admitted. The Herfindahl index has a positive correlation with 
the degree of competition, as the efficient-structure hypothesis predicts. 
5) The degree of collusion in the later years is greater than that for the pre-war period, 
suggesting that there remains room for more competition. 
Let us compare the results of this paper with those available for the competitiveness of the 
other Japanese financial industries. Uchida and Tsutsui (2005), using an approach similar to the 
one applied in this paper, considered the Japanese banking industry and estimated the degree of 
competition from 1974 to 2000. They found that the market had become more competitive in 
the 1970s, and judged that the city banks faced perfect competition in the middle of the 1990s. 
Estimating Panzar-Rosse’s H-statistic, Tsutsui and Kamesaka (2005) found that the Japanese 
securities industry was in monopolistic competition equilibrium in the 1980s and late 1990s 
and was in monopoly equilibrium in the early 1990s. In view of these findings, life insurance in 
Japan seems to be a less competitive industry than banking. Competition in banking improved 
in the late 1970s. Whereas it improved in the life insurance sector during the late 1990s, it did 
not reach perfect competition. 
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Table 1 Results of the Double Log Likelihood Ratio Tests of the Objectives of 
Mutual and Stock Life Insurance Companies 
 
 
 Mutual companies Stock companies 
(4) against (9): p-values 0.157 0.760 
(8) against (9): p-values 0.002 0.001 
 
Note: (4) and (8) represent models of the maximization of profits and the maximization of 
dividends plus profits, respectively. (9) is a general specification that includes (4) and (8) as 
special cases. 
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Table 2 Estimates of the Degree of Non-competition 
 
Parameter Estimate P-value tt ηλ  tλ  
19861986 ηµ  7.507 [.000] 0.313 0.339 
19871987 ηµ  7.333 [.000] 0.306 0.325 
19881988 ηµ  7.194 [.000] 0.288 0.328 
19891989 ηµ  7.200 [.000] 0.288 0.338 
19901990 ηµ  7.361 [.000] 0.283 0.342 
19911991 ηµ  7.339 [.000] 0.272 0.338 
19921992 ηµ  6.922 [.000] 0.256 0.287 
19931993 ηµ  6.784 [.000] 0.251 0.269 
19941994 ηµ  6.869 [.000] 0.254 0.267 
19951995 ηµ  6.657 [.000] 0.230 0.224 
19961996 ηµ  6.826 [.000] 0.166 0.159 
19971997 ηµ  6.730 [.000] 0.168 0.157 
19981998 ηµ  6.846 [.000] 0.171 0.155 
19991999 ηµ  6.582 [.000] 0.161 0.136 
20002000 ηµ  6.068 [.000] 0.156 0.133 
20012001 ηµ  6.215 [.000] 0.164 0.133 
20022002 ηµ  6.171 [.000] 0.181 0.150 
a  1 4.569  410× [.025]   
a  2 4.796  510× [.000]   
a  3 -0.250 [.885]   
a  4 0.068 [.973]   
2b  0.276 [.000]   
3b  -165.856 [.678]   
4b  -48.206 [.728]   
5b  798.980 [.676]   
6b  -422.421 [.709]   
2R  for (3) 0.899    
2R  for (4) 0.992    
Note: The results of simultaneous estimation of eqs. (3) and (4) are shown. Estimates of , 
, and  are omitted to save space. Observations are for all existing life insurance firms. 
tob ,
iob , ib ,1
tt ηλ is calculated by multiplying tt ηµ  by the number of companies. tλ  is calculated by 
multiplying tt ηλ  by tη  presented in Table 3.  
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Table 3 Estimates of the Degree of Collusion 
 
Parameter Estimate P-value Parameter Estimate P-value 
1986α  1.022 [.000] 1986η  1.084 [.000] 
1987α  0.998 [.000] 1987η  1.064 [.000] 
1988α  1.082 [.000] 1988η  1.139 [.000] 
1989α  1.110 [.000] 1989η  1.174 [.000] 
1990α  1.121 [.000] 1990η  1.209 [.000] 
1991α  1.144 [.000] 1991η  1.242 [.000] 
1992α  1.032 [.000] 1992η  1.119 [.000] 
1993α  0.982 [.000] 1993η  1.069 [.000] 
1994α  0.956 [.000] 1994η  1.048 [.000] 
1995α  0.880 [.000] 1995η  0.975 [.000] 
1996α  0.844 [.000] 1996η  0.955 [.000] 
1997α  0.830 [.000] 1997η  0.936 [.000] 
1998α  0.787 [.000] 1998η  0.903 [.000] 
1999α  0.737 [.000] 1999η  0.849 [.000] 
2000α  0.752 [.000] 2000η  0.858 [.000] 
2001α  0.703 [.000] 2001η  0.811 [.000] 
2002α  0.708 [.000] 2002η  0.824 [.000] 
a  3 -0.892 [.000]    
a  4 -0.186 [.285]    
a  5 -2.024  410× [.000]    
a  6 2.802  410× [.059]    
2b  0.052 [.000]    
3b  -27.056 [.300]    
4b  -6.649 [.461]    
5b  132.894 [.285]    
6b  -58.224 [.425]    
2R  for (3) 0.997     
2R  for (7) 0.999     
 
Note: The results of simultaneous estimation of eqs. (3) and (7) are shown. Estimates of , 
, and  are omitted to save space. Observations are for all existing life insurance firms. 
tob ,
iob , ib ,1
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Table 4 Causes of the progress of competition 
 
Dependent? variable α  ηλ  λ  
Variable Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Constant 1.599 [.003] 0.539 [.029] 0.625 [.052] 
CIX 0.006 [.070] 0.000 [.960] 0.002 [.390] 
HI -10.204 [.001] -2.519 [.052] -4.484 [.014] 
DIL -0.180 [.010] -0.076 [.027] -0.116 [.014] 
DFAIL -0.111 [.042] -0.072 [.014] -0.094 [.015] 
2R  0.762  0.568  0.656  
 
Note: We regress the degree of collusion and degree of non-competition over the business condition 
(CIX), the Herfindahl index (HI), and two year-dummy variables representing deregulations. Number of 
observations is 17. 
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Figure 1 The GDP Growth Rate and the Growth Rate of the Value of Policies in Force 
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Source: NIKKEI NEEDS Macro data file.  
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Figure 2 The Current Profit Rate 
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Note: The current profit rate of the life insurance industry and that of the corporate sector of all industries are shown. Current profit rate is 
the current profit/asset ratio. 
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Figure 3 The Yields of Assets and the Assumed Interest Rate 
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Note: The assumed interest rate is the expected rate of return on the assets of the company. The assumed interest rate here is the average 
for outstanding contracts. Data on the yield of assets are taken from Insurance: issue of life insurance statistics, and data on assumed 
interest rates is taken from Toyo Keizai Weekly: special issue on life insurance. 
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Figure 4 The number of Life Insurance Firms 
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Source: Insurance: issue of life insurance statistics.  
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Figure 5 The Herfindahl Index (HI) 
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Note: The Herfindahl index, taking the total assets as a proxy for firm size. 
 
 32
 
Figure 6 Estimates of the Degree of Non-Competition ( tt ηλ ) 
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Note: Estimates are based on simultaneous estimation of eqs. (3) and (4).?   
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Figure 7 Estimates of the Degree of Collusion ( tα ) 
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Note: Estimates are based on simultaneous estimation of eqs. (3) and (7). 
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Figure 8 Estimates of the Degree of Non-Competition ( tλ ) 
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Note: tλ  is calculated by multiplying tη  taken from the estimation of collusion with the estimates of tt ηλ /  shown in  
Figure 6. Line of 1/n corresponds to Cournot oligopoly. 
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